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Appraisal theories of emotion: State of the art and future development 
Although a scholarly topic over the centuries, emotion was first scientifically 
approached by Darwin (1872), who advocated a functional approach. Soon after, James 
(1890) started a debate about the elicitation and differentiation of the emotions  and even 
about the very definition of the term emotion, that still continues. There have been periods of 
dominance for certain theories, like Tomkins’ (1962) revival of  Darwin’s ideas in the form of 
discrete or basic emotion theory, a revival of peripheral theories by Schachter (1964), and 
various revivals of Wundt’s (1896) dimensional theory. In the 1960's, Arnold (1960) and 
Lazarus (1966) pioneered a new theoretical approach called appraisal theory, which is in 
essence a systematization of ancient ideas about emotion, reflecting the ideas of Aristotle, 
Hume (1739-40), Spinoza (1677), and Sartre (1939). In the 1980's this approach took on new 
vigor, with a number of theorists proposing variants of appraisal theory, developing concrete 
predictions, and testing them empirically. Since then, “appraisal” has become a household 
word in emotion research, but the term is used in widely different forms and different 
theoretical and atheoretical contexts. This special issue attempts to delineate the fundamental 
architecture of a family of theories that can be rightly called appraisal theories in a strict 
sense. In this issue we discuss the design features of these theories, their current development, 
and the empirical support for them, as well as unresolved issues, new developments, and 
critical objections. Four major contributions outline the scope of the current debate and a 
group of commentators provide a critical echo.  
In this special issue we will focus on the theories of Arnold (1960), Lazarus (1991), 
Scherer (1984, 2009), Smith and Ellsworth (1985, Ellsworth, 1991), Frijda (1986, 2007), 
Roseman (1984), and Clore and Ortony (2000). The basic premise of appraisal theories is that 
emotions are adaptive responses, which reflect appraisals of features of the environment that 
are significant for the organism’s well-being. Many other emotion theories also see emotions 
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as adaptive responses to the environment and some also toss in the term appraisal. Yet not all 
theories qualify as appraisal theories. We first describe appraisal theories and the criteria that 
differentiate them from other theories. Then we map out some of the diversity within the 
family of appraisal theories.  
Basic Description of Appraisal Theories and Differentiation from Other Theories 
Contemporary appraisal theories define emotions as  processes, rather than  states. 
This is reflected in the fact that the term emotion is often used as shorthand for an emotional 
episode. Appraisal theories are componential theories in that they view an emotional episode 
as involving changes in a number of organismic subsystems or components. Components 
include an appraisal component with evaluations of the environment and the person-
environment interaction; a motivational component with action tendencies or other forms of 
action readiness; a somatic component with peripheral physiological responses; a motor 
component with expressive and instrumental behavior; and a feeling component with 
subjective experience or feelings. The emotion process is continuous and recursive. Changes 
in one component feed back to other components. For example, changes in appraisal may lead 
to changes in physiological and behavioral responses. These may, in turn, lead to changes in 
appraisal, either directly or indirectly (via a change in the stimulus situation). As a 
consequence, several emotional episodes may run in parallel. Some appraisal theories build in 
the notion of immediate efference (e.g., Ellsworth, 1991; Scherer, 2009): The processes in 
each of the components do not need to be completed before they can produce changes in later 
components.  
Appraisal theories are not the only theories that treat the emotional episode as a 
process of changes in components. Many emotion theorists casually mention the term 
appraisal and some even describe it as a component (e.g., Russell, 2003; Ekman, 1994; 
Matsumoto & Ekman, 2009). The mere mention of appraisal or even the inclusion of an 
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appraisal component is not sufficient for calling a theory an appraisal theory. In the remainder 
of this introduction, we will point to important differences between appraisal theories and 
other theories. Major differences include (a) the definition of appraisal,  in terms of  both 
content and type of process, (b) the role of appraisal in emotion and predictions about the 
relation between changes in appraisal and changes in other components, and (c) predictions 
about individual, cultural, and developmental differences.   
Definition of appraisal 
Appraisal is a process that detects and assesses the significance of the environment for 
well-being. Significance for well-being is best conceptualized as the satisfaction or 
obstruction of concerns (Frijda, 1986, 2007). "Concerns" include the individual's needs, 
attachments, values, current goals and beliefs (Frijda, 2007; Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 2004). 
They include everything that an individual cares about (Frankfurt, 1988). It follows that 
appraisal is inherently transactional: It involves an interaction between the event and the 
appraiser (Lazarus, 1991).  
Unlike other emotion theories that vaguely propose that cognitions contribute to 
emotions (Schachter, 1964; Barrett, 2009; Russell, 2003), appraisal theories specify the 
appraisal criteria or variables that are most important in differentiating emotions. In addition 
to the variables of goal relevance and goal congruence (which refer to the relevance and 
congruence of events for goals or, more broadly, concerns), most appraisal theories include 
the variables of certainty, agency (event caused by oneself, someone else, or impersonal 
circumstances), and coping potential or control. For example, a person sees her neighbor as 
the cause (agency) of her lack of sleep ( goal incongruence)  and does not know (certainty) 
whether she can change the situation (control). Some appraisal theorists also propose that 
novelty, expectancy, urgency, intentionality, legitimacy or fairness, and/or norm compatibility 
contribute to differences in emotions.  Appraisal is a process by which values are produced 
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for one or more appraisal variables. There is fair, but not complete, agreement among 
appraisal theorists on the number and identity of these variables. These theorists do not claim 
that their list is exhaustive, nor that it covers all people, cultures, or emotions.  
Appraisal theories specify not only the contents of appraisal, but also the process of 
appraisal  in terms of the underlying mechanisms, the nature of the representations on which 
these mechanisms operate, and the degree of automaticity. Appraisal theorists have proposed 
two or three mechanisms underlying appraisal, endorsing a dual or triple mode view of 
appraisal. Dual mode views (e.g., Clore & Ortony, 2000) distinguish between (a) a rule-based 
mechanism, consisting of the on-line computation of one or more appraisal values, and (b) an 
associative mechanism (also called schematic mechanism), consisting of the activation of 
learned associations between representations of stimuli and previously stored appraisal 
outputs (individual values or entire patterns). Triple mode views (e.g., Leventhal & Scherer, 
1987) add a sensory-motor mechanism, consisting of the activation of unlearned associations 
between sensory features, hedonic feelings, and motor responses, for example, the association 
between the sensation of the earth shaking under one’s feet, unpleasant feelings, and muscle 
contraction.  
Although some critics have mischaracterized appraisal as a non-automatic, rule-based 
process that operates on symbolic representations, appraisal theorists generally agree that 
various mechanisms can underlie appraisal and that they can operate on a wide range of 
representations: conceptual and/or propositional vs. perceptual and/or embodied; symbolic vs. 
subsymbolic; locationist vs. distributed. They believe that appraisal often proceeds 
automatically (i.e., uncontrolled in the promoting or counteracting sense, unconscious, 
efficient, and/or fast, Moors, 2010), but can also sometimes proceed non-automatically. 
Appraisal does not consist primarily of abstract cognitive principles, and often involves the 
recognition of action affordances in perceived events (Gibson, 1979) – the perception that an 
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event invites or suggests what one can do with it, or what it prevents one from doing. 
Role of Appraisal in Emotion 
Like several other emotion theories, appraisal theories include appraisal as a 
component in the emotional episode. Unlike these other theories, appraisal theories assign a 
central role to this component, suggesting that appraisal triggers and differentiates emotional 
episodes through synchronic changes in other components. Appraisal determines the intensity 
and quality of action tendencies, physiological responses, behavior, and feelings (Clore & 
Ortony, 2000; Frijda, 2007; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman & Smith, 2001; Reisenzein, 1994; 
Scherer, 2001). This is what is meant when appraisal theorists argue that appraisal elicits or 
causes emotions. Several appraisal theorists have detailed hypotheses about the influence of 
appraisal on the other components (cf. below). Few of these authors  think that appraisal is a 
necessary cause of changes in other components; most accept instances in which the other 
components are determined by processes that do not qualify as appraisal. As captured in the 
notion of recursiveness, most authors also accept influences from the other components on 
appraisal.  
The feeling component is often seen as the conscious reflection of the changes in some 
(Lambie & Marcel, 2002) or all (Scherer, 2004) other components. For theorists who include 
appraisal as a component in the emotional episode, appraisal is one determinant of the feeling 
component. Concretely, the appraisal process results in an appraisal output, that is, a 
representation of one or more appraisal values. This representation is unconscious by default 
but part of it can become conscious and hence become part of the content of feelings (Scherer, 
2009). For theorists who believe that the appraisal component shapes the motivational, 
somatic, and motor components, appraisal is the core determinant of feelings. Appraisal 
theories allow variation in the number of appraisals that are made (appraisal variables that are 
processed). If only a few appraisals yield results, the emotional experience is relatively 
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undifferentiated and global; if many appraisals are made, the emotional experience is highly 
differentiated and specific. Moreover, an emotional experience may become more complex 
over several recursive cycles.  
Implications for Individual, Cultural, and Developmental Differences 
Appraisal theories include hypotheses about individual, cultural, and developmental 
differences that other theories do not. Appraisal theories can account for differences in 
people's emotional responses to the same situation. If two people differ in their appraisal of 
the event’s novelty, goal congruence, controllability, or any of the other appraisal variables, 
their emotions will differ correspondingly. If they have different concerns, one person might 
appraise the event as furthering those concerns, while the other sees it as obstructing them. 
Some mental disorders may be characterized by chronically dysfunctional appraisals, as in 
obsessive-compulsive disease. Appraisal patterns may also differ in different cultures. For 
example, Japanese and Americans differ in their appraisals of agency. Japanese are more 
likely to blame themselves for negative outcomes and to experience shame, while Americans 
are more likely to blame others and experience anger (Imada & Ellsworth, 2011). Appraisal 
theories assume that there is a variable relation between stimuli and emotions, but a stable 
relation between appraisals and emotions. In general, the same appraisals lead to the same 
emotions; different appraisals lead to different emotions.  
The appraisal process also depends on the availability of cognitive mechanisms which 
unfold over phylogenetic and ontogenetic development. Many animals can make  rudimentary  
(and sometimes even quite sophisticated) appraisals (Désiré, Veissier,  Després, & Boissy, 
2004). While intrinsic valence appraisals are present in the newborn, some appraisals develop 
later, and appraisal theories predict that emotions will not be differentiated until the child is 
capable of making the relevant appraisals. For example, a cognitive restructuring around nine 
months of age seems to be decisive for the operation of appraisals based on expectancy and 
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determine the nature of the surprise response (Scherer, Zentner, & Stern, 2004). Similarly, the 
generalized distress experienced by infants differentiates into sadness and anger when the 
infant is able to perceive differences in agency.  
Differences among Appraisal Theories and Unresolved Issues 
In addition to the commonalities among appraisal theories described above, there are 
issues about which there is disagreement as well as issues that are not entirely resolved. These 
issues can be divided into those that relate to the appraisal process and those that relate to the 
relation between appraisals and other components. Issues related to the appraisal process can 
be divided into those that relate to the content of the appraisal process and those that relate to 
underlying mechanisms, representations, and operating conditions.  
Appraisal Process  
Content of appraisal.  
This section discusses the number and nature of the appraisal variables postulated and 
the number of the appraisal values that are possible for each variable. There is substantial 
agreement on a core set of appraisal variables. Examples are goal relevance, goal congruence 
(also called goal conduciveness or motive consistency), certainty, coping potential (also called 
control and/or power), and agency (also called cause). Other appraisal variables are included 
in some but not all appraisal theories. For example, some theories include novelty (or related 
concepts such as suddenness, change, familiarity, unexpectedness; Scherer, 1984; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990) whereas others do not (Lazarus, 1991). 
Some include intrinsic valence or pleasantness (Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1984; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985) whereas others do not (Roseman, 1984; Lazarus, 1991). Some include type 
of goal (Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1984) whereas others do not (Scherer, 1984). Some include 
norm/self compatibility (Scherer, 1984) whereas others subsume it under the variable of goal 
congruence (in combination with type of goal; Lazarus, 1991).    
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In some theories, appraisal variables are categorical, with a discrete number of 
possible values. For example, Lazarus (1991) proposed two values for goal congruence: goal 
congruence and goal incongruence. In other theories (Ellsworth, 1991; Scherer, 1984), 
appraisal variables are dimensional, with potentially infinite values. For example, goal 
congruence ranges from entirely goal congruent to entirely  goal incongruent. In still other 
theories (e.g., Roseman, 1996), appraisal variables are dimensional but the system provides 
anchor points so that it can produce a discrete number of values.   
The number and nature of the appraisal variables and/or values is closely related to the 
number and nature of the emotions that one can or wishes to explain. In general, more 
emotions require more appraisal variables and/or more appraisal values. Turning it around, 
more appraisal variables and/or more appraisal values allow more variety in emotions. Two 
appraisal variables with two values each can account for four emotions. Seven appraisal 
variables with an infinite number of values each can account for an infinite number of 
emotions. The number and nature of the emotions that one wishes to explain can be traced 
back to metatheoretical choices such as whether one strives for parsimony and/or a focus on 
natural language descriptors of emotions, on the one hand, or exhaustiveness and/or a focus 
on variety, on the other hand (Scherer, 1999).   
Type of process. 
We mentioned that most appraisal theorists endorse a dual or triple mode view of 
appraisal. One set of questions involves the relations between mechanisms (e.g., rule-based, 
associative, sensory-motor), automaticity, and formats of representations or codes (e.g., 
image-like, verbal-like, symbolic, subsymbolic). Leventhal and Scherer (1987) suggested that 
(a) rule-based mechanisms are often non-automatic and tend to operate on conceptual  codes, 
(b) the associative mechanism is often automatic and typically operates on perceptual codes, 
and (c) the sensory-motor mechanism is automatic and operates on sensory codes. These 
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assumptions, although in line with dual and triple mode views in other research domains, 
remain to be tested empirically. It is possible that rule-based mechanisms can also be 
automatic (Anderson, 1992; Moors, 2010; Clore & Ortony, 2000) and that the associative 
mechanism can also operate on conceptual codes (Smith & Kirby, 2001).  
Another set of questions involves the relationship of the content of appraisal to 
automaticity, mechanisms, and codes. Appraisal theories assume that increasing practice leads 
to greater automatization and that all appraisal variables can be processed more or less 
automatically. This assumption has received increasing empirical support (cf. Moors, 2010).    
Another question is which appraisal variables can be processed with which 
mechanism. Leventhal and Scherer (1987) suggested that all appraisal variables can be 
processed with all mechanisms. On the other hand, it has been suggested that some appraisal 
variables (novelty, intrinsic valence) can be processed with simpler mechanisms than others 
(norm/self compatibility; Scherer, 2009; Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Frijda, 2007).  
In addition to the relations between appraisal variables, automaticity,  mechanisms, 
and codes, numerous other processing details remain to be specified. One such issue is 
whether appraisal variables are processed sequentially or in parallel. In Scherer’s (2009) 
theory, appraisal variables can be processed in parallel but preliminary values for them are 
produced sequentially (Aue, Flykt, & Scherer, 2007; Grandjean & Scherer, 2008). Other 
appraisal theorists think the sequentiality assumption is overly restrictive.  
A further set of questions focuses on the implementation of appraisal in the brain. One 
question is whether appraisal variables are tied to specific neural substrates or whether 
appraisal variables describe the content of information that is processed by content-
independent mechanisms. Some appraisal researchers search for neural substrates that are 
specific for appraisal variables (e.g., Sander, Grafman, & Zalla, 2003). They show that 
regions (e.g., the amygdala) that were previously thought to be specific for one basic emotion 
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(fear) are involved in a set of appraisal variables (novelty, goal relevance, intrinsic valence). 
They do not claim, however, that the amygdala is specific for these appraisal variables: The 
amygdala may have other functions, and there may be other regions that can process these 
appraisal variables.  
From Appraisal to Emotion or the Other Components  
Most appraisal theories have hypotheses (and research) about the relation between 
(patterns of) appraisal values and emotions indicated by natural language descriptors 
(although they believe that appraisals can also account for emotional states that are not 
described by language).  For example, Lazarus (1991) hypothesized that stimuli appraised as 
goal relevant, goal incongruent, and difficult to cope with correspond to fear. Some appraisal 
theorists have also developed (and tested) hypotheses about the relation between appraisal 
values and values on other components like action tendencies (Ellsworth & Tong, 2006; 
Frijda, 1986; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Roseman, 2001), physiological responses 
(Aue & Scherer, 2008; Scherer, 1993, 2009; Smith, 1989), and facial and vocal expressions 
(Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Laird & Bresler, 1992; Scherer, 2009; Scherer & Ellgring, 2007).  
Appraisal theories have hypotheses not only about the relation between appraisals and 
emotions or the other components, but also about the mechanisms underlying the influence of 
appraisal on the other components. There are two broad proposals. The first proposal (e.g., 
Lazarus, 1991) states that appraisal values are integrated in a pattern, which determines the 
emotion. This pattern determines the values of the other components. The question arises 
whether a representation of an emotion must be activated, and if so, what kind of a 
representation. The second proposal (e.g., Ellsworth, 1991; Scherer, 2009) states that each 
appraisal value directly influences (some of) the other components without travelling via a 
representation of an emotion. According to one variant of this proposal, appraisal values 
directly and independently influence each of the components (motivational, somatic, motor, 
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feeling) in parallel. According to another variant of this proposal (e.g., Frijda, 2009; Scherer, 
2009), appraisal values have to travel via the motivational component before influencing the 
somatic and motor components. Aspects of all these components are reflected in the feeling 
component.  
Few appraisal theorists have presented hypotheses about the mechanisms underlying 
the influence of the components on the feeling component. Ellsworth (1991), Frijda (2007), 
and Scherer (2004) have suggested that the content of feelings represents an integration of 
several or all the other components. Unresolved issues are the extent to which aspects of each 
component are centrally represented , their weight in determining the overall quality of the 
feelings, and the extent to which they are experienced holistically or keep a certain amount of 
granularity. Lambie and Marcel (2002) argue this to be strongly dependent upon attentional 
variables.  
Conclusion 
 Appraisal theory was proposed (Arnold, 1960) and developed (Lazarus, 1966) to 
explain how different emotions may emerge from the same event, in different individuals and 
on different occasions. Appraisal processes do so by using information from events in their 
context, the individual's concerns, history, and other sensitivities. Appraisal processes  and the 
information that they use thus form the main causal determinants of the various components 
that together form the multicomponential response patterns called "emotions". Appraisal 
processes mediate the significance of events for the individual's well-being. Appraisal theory 
thereby elaborates and specifies a central topic in the psychology of emotion: the confluence 
of cognition and emotion that results when information is viewed in the light of motivation..  
 Our sketch of appraisal theories hints at current developments in the theory. One 
development concerns the insight that emotional events are often highly complex. They tend 
to instigate various cognitive, motivational, and somatic components simultaneously, in 
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competition, in conflict, or in interaction. Many events are congruent for one concern and 
incongruent for another. One both wants something and doesn’t want it (Lewis & Todd, 2007; 
Mesquita & Frijda, 2010). This multiplicity is at the core of emotion regulation, and suggests 
an integration  of emotion regulation within appraisal theory, and not as a set of additional or 
external phenomena.  
 Further developments concern detailed insights into the mechanisms underlying 
appraisal. Any mechanism that deals with the appraisal variables contained in events can 
potentially underlie appraisal. The mechanisms involved can operate on various codes, and 
they can take place in an automatic or non-automatic way. This is most conspicuous when 
appraisals develop in social interactions. Cool reception of one's smile elicits the appraisal 
"not welcome" (i.e., goal incongruence) without any abstract categorization necessary to 
imbue the event with meaning and implications for action (Parkinson (2007). Appraisal can 
occur on the spot in response to what another person does or does not do, whether or not the 
perceiver has pre-existing knowledge. A new direction for research  is the investigation of the 
mechanisms and codes that are actually involved in social and non-social situations. To 
conclude, there seems to be a movement toward greater agreement about the core features of 
appraisal theories. Nevertheless, many issues remain open, some of which receive in-depth 
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